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Investors in private corporations face unique problems relating to corporate control, illiquidity and 
valuation of securities. In this research, we survey a large sample of US corporations. Our sample 
includes both private and public firms. Major findings of our research are as follows: Private firms use 
written shareholder agreements for safeguarding ownership interests and dividend payments. Family 
owned firms dominate the ownership structure of private firms. Insiders of private firms own a much 
larger proportion of common stock than insiders in public firms, and the CEOs of private firms often 
happen to be the largest stockholders.  
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 The size of executive teams and boards are smaller in private firms than in public firms. 
However, the proportion of executives and board members who are also stockholders of the firm is larger 
in public firms. We find that a greater percentage of members on boards of private firms are outsiders, 
consistent with the arguments about the need for outside board members for objectivity and resolving 
conflicts among the closely-related stockholders. Our research also documents evidence relating to 
illiquidity of stock ownership and the different valuation approaches used in private firms. 
 
Introduction 
 Privately-held (or private) firms comprise a vast majority of for-profit business enterprises in the 
United States, and they are vital for the well being of U.S. economy. According to a report by the U.S. 
Small Business Administration, during the period 1990-95 small firms (employees <=500) accounted for 
90.1 percent of new establishments and 76.5 percent of net new jobs. Nevertheless, research on small 
firms is scant, probably for want of readily available data or less enthusiasm on the part of academicians. 
Further, the findings from research on large, public corporations are for the most part inadequate to 
explain the agency relationships and corporate control issues in small, private firms for several reasons.  
 The issues relating to agency problems and corporate governance issues in large corporations 
have been widely discussed in the financial literature [For example, see Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Myers (1977), Smith and Warner (1979), Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983), Easterbrook (1984), and 
Barnea et al. (1985)]. Primarily, the research emphasizes the agency relationships between i) managers 
and equity holders, and ii) equity and debt holders. Managers of large corporations, with very little or no 
equity interests in the firm but with control over the firm's resources, would have incentives to 
expropriate wealth from equity holders at large through shirking, excessive perk consumption, and 
expense preference behavior. 
 The nature of agency problems and issues relating to corporate governance in private firms are 
substantially different from that in large corporations. In private firms, those who contribute most or a 
major part of equity capital hold control over the firm‟s affairs and the minority shareholders, having 
little control over the firm‟s affairs, tend to be in a disadvantageous position. Furthermore, stockholders 
face liquidity problems because of the small number of investors, lack of a ready market for the firm's 
stock, and information limitations. The mechanisms for disciplining the managers of large corporations, 
i.e., capital market resolutions, regulatory discipline, and takeover possibilities are not generally 
available to the stockholders of private firms.  
 Owing to these peculiarities in private firms, it is apparent that researchers should examine issues 
relating to corporate control, distribution of cash flows, and valuation of securities in those firms apart 
from the widely available research findings on large corporations.  Extant literature on small business 
finance so far has largely focused on examination of corporate financial policies (e.g., capital structure 
and working capital management) compared to issues concerning corporate governance, shareholder 
agreements, and valuation of common stock.  This paper attempts to fill the gap by examining the data 
generated from a nation-wide survey of private firms conducted during the year 1998. Our paper is 
unique in several ways. First, it examines the role and importance of written shareholder agreements as a 
mechanism for establishing shareholder rights in private firms. Second, it ties in the corporate 
governance structure (composition of executive teams and boards of directors) to ownership differences 
and CEO profiles in private firms. Third, the paper makes a detailed examination of illiquidity and 
valuation of common stock in private firms. Although our emphasis is on private firms, we will make 
comparisons with public firms using the data on public firms obtained in the same survey. The rest of the 





present a description of the survey data and results. Section III will provide a summary of the paper and 
our concluding remarks.  
 
I. Literature Review 
 In this section we will review the literature pertaining to shareholder agreements, corporate 
governance (management teams and board composition), illiquidity of corporate securities, and methods 
for valuation of common stock in close corporations.  
 
 A. Shareholder Agreements  
 Typically, the corporate structure of large, publicly owned corporations provides for control of 
the firm‟s affairs by the charter and bylaws, proxy system, and majority voting. However, shareholders in 
close corporations often like to act as partners without being constrained by the majority vote limitations 
of corporate structure. Thus, shareholders‟ agreements similar to partnership deeds have come into 
vogue. Myers (2000) has developed a model in which he makes one important assumption, i.e., outsiders 
cannot prevent insiders from capturing part or all of operating cash flow.  His model as it applies to 
partnerships shows that the agreements typically cover items such as specify ownership shares, 
dividends, and the commitment of assets to the firm. When viewed from the perspective of a closely-held 
corporation, the shareholder agreements provide for a low cost negotiating tool for the equity holders, 
both inside and outside. The stockholders' agreements are generally drawn at the time the firm is 
organized, and they cover such items as employment and compensation of stockholder-employees, 
dividend policy, protection against dilution of ownership interests, sale of stock to outsiders, and 
amendments to charter or bylaws.  
 Hand, Lloyd, and Rogow (1982), Buchholz, Crane, and Nager (1999), Bennedsen and Wolfenzon 
(2000), and O‟Neal and Thompson (2000), among others, discuss the usefulness of written stockholders‟ 
agreements in resolving conflicts between shareholders of close corporations. Hand, Lloyd, and Rogow 
state that their  purpose is to limit powers normally vested in corporate stockholders and the board of 
directors. According to O‟Neal and Thompson (2000), the primary objective of shareholders‟ agreements 
is to protect the minority shareholder against the power vested in the majority by the principle of majority 
rule and permit the minority shareholder to obtain membership on the board of directors or some other 
voice in the management of the corporation. This view is further strengthened by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) who argue that the issue concerning expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling 
shareholders is even more important than the issue of agency costs associated with expropriation of all 
shareholders by managers. 
 Buchholz, Crane, and Nager (1999) argue that shareholder agreements are critical for 
documenting shareholder rights for maintaining smooth relationships among shareholders of family 
businesses and that the agreement can “assure continued family ownership and provide an „escape‟ 
mechanism for disgruntled owners” (p.166). Further, they state, “If any owner decides that he cannot 
tolerate the way business is being run, that agreement will provide the terms under which he can sell his 
stock. Co-owners and co-managers must not be held hostage to each other if relationships go south. A 
buy-sell agreement is the ultimate pressure relief valve that can keep the family from blowing up”(p. 
158). 
 The question of legal validity of shareholders‟ agreements has been widely discussed by O‟Neal 
and Thompson (2000). From their discussion, prior to 1960 courts generally invalidated shareholders‟ 
agreements on the basis of their inconsistency with the statutory provisions conferred on the board of 
directors. However, since 1960 „courts and legislators have shown an increased sensitivity to the need of 





shareholders in close corporations, O‟Neal and Thompson state that in several states veto arrangements 
in shareholders‟ agreements are enforceable.  
 In accepting shareholders‟ agreements as valid contracts, courts seem to have taken the approach 
of (1) permitting participants in close corporations to depart from traditional statutory norms, and (2) 
protecting minority shareholders. As examples of legal validation for shareholders‟ agreements, we refer 
to some court cases described in O‟Neal and Thompson. In an Illinois case, Galler vs. Galler (1964), the 
shareholders‟ agreement called for, among other things, declaration of dividends if the firm earned 
surplus in excess of  $500,000. Another provision required the company to purchase a sufficient number 
of shares from a deceased participant‟s estate in order to pay for the estate and inheritance taxes. The 
intermediate appellate court decided against the agreement but it was subsequently upheld by the Illinois 
Supreme Court. In the case of Weber v. Sidney (1963) the court held an oral agreement about division of 
the earnings and profits of a corporation between two shareholders to be valid and enforceable. In 
another case, Wasserman v. Rosengarden (1980) „court upheld the validity of an oral agreement among 
all the shareholders of a close corporation providing for election of the parties there to as directors and 
officers and for an equal distribution of salaries and profits as long as the parties remained shareholders 
or the corporation remained in existence.‟ In Adler v. Svingos (1981), the court upheld an agreement 
requiring unanimous consent of all shareholders on all corporate matters to be valid, and did not violate 
the provisions of the New York Business Corporate Law. 
 
 B. Corporate Control and Governance 
 In corporations, control is vested in two bodies in a firm, i.e., the board of directors and the top 
management. According to Neubauer and Lank (1998), the key elements of a typical corporate 
governance structure in family-controlled businesses are the family (and its institutions), the board of 
directors, and top management. In large, public corporations the board of directors has the important role 
of monitoring and controlling the firm's top management with the objective of protecting the 
shareholders' interests, in addition to fulfilling its statutory obligations as required by corporate laws. The 
board‟s monitoring role is vital for mitigating agency problems between managers and stockholders as 
discussed, for example, in Jensen and Meckling (1976). In private corporations, however, the board's role 
is different in nature. There is very little need for the board to monitor the performance of top 
management for two reasons. First, the management teams consist mostly of the stockholders themselves, 
and outsiders, if any, on management teams are few. Second, more often than not, the members on the 
board are the same as those of the management team. Third, the board's primary purpose in small firms 
would, therefore, be to fulfill the statutory requirements and involve itself in the firm's affairs in several 
other ways. 
 Empirical studies using data from large publicly owned corporations, for example Bathala and 
Rao (1995), have found that outside directors on the board play an important role in mitigating agency 
conflicts between management and shareholders. Contrary to this, according to Mace (1948) board 
members of small firms advise more on the operational areas than play a major role in the formulation of 
higher level strategies or monitoring of top management. Outside members on boards, not restricted by 
family or personal loyalties, were found to be extremely effective in training the presidents of their firms 
to be better administrators. The outside board members were also helpful to firms in matters such as 
helping in management succession, raising bank loans, interviewing candidates for jobs, or offering 
suggestions for improving the firm's operating performance. Outside directors were also seen to play a 
valuable role in pacifying the differences among major stockholders or key executives who, most often, 
happen to be the members of the same family or close relatives. Further, firms with minority shareholders 





states, "the presence of such a person or persons on the board constituted considerable assurance to the 
minority stockholders that the enterprise would be operated on a plane of high standards."  
 Castaldi and Wortman (1984) identify five attributes of board members which are especially 
valuable to small firms. These factors are equity ownership, technical expertise, management experience, 
special economic service, and broad economic specification. Neubauer and Lank (1998) observe that 
outside members in family businesses are a valuable resource in several ways. They refer to a seminar 
with participants from 141 family-controlled firms. The responses from the seminar participants showed 
that 79 percent of the firms had mixed boards. The responses further indicated that family-controlled 
businesses value outside directors for their expertise, consultancy, objectivity, neutrality, and outside 
view, among others. In contrast to this, on the basis of a survey of Inc. 500 companies, Ford (1988) 
concluded that outside directors are of less value than inside directors. He conjectured that it could be 
due to the outsiders' lack of knowledge about the firm and its environment, and their lack of availability 
for consulting except during meetings.  
 The literature reviewed above touches upon just one limitation of the small firms‟ management 
teams, i.e., their deficiencies in management aspects. Other important attributes of management teams 
such as the size, composition, and roles of majority vs. minority stockholders on management teams, and 
their implications to agency and corporate control have not been examined. This research attempts to fill 
the void in that respect. 
 
 C. Illiquidity and Valuation Issues 
 With about 25 million businesses in operation in the USA and less than one-half of one percent 
traded in any meaningful way, the need for valuation and a review of the issues as they pertain to small 
and/or privately-held businesses is large and increasing. Traditional equity valuation models (e.g., the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model and Dividend Discount Models) rely upon past prices, dividends, and 
historical growth rates in order to evaluate risk-return potentials in valuing common stocks. Those 
valuation models cannot be used for private firms that have no trading in common stock. Further, as 
Damodaran (1996) points out, even historical earnings, growth rates, and cash-flow estimations of private 
firms are often unreliable because of the difficulty in distinguishing between management compensation 
and return on capital. Owing to these limitations, comparative valuations or use of independent 
appraisers are likely to serve as suitable approaches for valuing privately owned stock. 
 In a survey of members of the American Society of Appraisers (ASA) and the Institute of 
Business Appraisers (IBA), Dukes, Bowlin, and Ma (DBM) (1996) identified ten approaches which were 
reported to be used in the process of valuing privately-held businesses. The numerous methods of 
valuation and the lack of consistency in valuations have been addressed in the Central Trust Case (1962), 
by Hubbard and Waldron (1988), Waldron and Hubbard (1991), and Dukes (2001). The issues of non-
marketability and control premiums have been addressed in different ways by different authors but with 
the same intent - that of explaining why a closely-held firm should be valued in ways that show the 
illiquid nature of the small firm. Emory (1995) has made and published seven studies covering the overall 
time period of 1985-1995. The research on small-firm valuations, however, has not related the 
approaches to the differences in ownership and corporate governance. Further, the underlying corporate 
governance and control factors as they relate to the illiquidity of the ownership in private companies have 
also not been fully explored. This research will seek to determine if agency relationships, differences in 
ownership structure, and corporate governance issues have a bearing on the stock valuation methods and 






II. Data and Results 
 A. Data 
 The data for the study is obtained using a survey instrument. The firms in the Standard & Poor‟s 
Directory of Corporations, 1997, listed in approximately 3,000 pages, formed the initial population of 
firms for our survey. For our sample, we selected one firm from each page (the first firm at the top of 
left-hand column). Then, we eliminated certain not-for-profit entities (hospitals, universities, etc.) from 
the list and ended up with a mailing list of 2,870 firms – 2,251 private firms (78.4 percent) and 619 
public firms (21.6 percent). The survey was anonymous and the questionnaire was not marked in order to 
ensure anonymity of responding firms. The survey instrument was four pages long and it sought 
information on ownership/governance issues, shareholder agreements, sale/transfer of ownership, and 
financial policies. 
 The survey questionnaires were mailed in the month of August, 1998. A total of 275 firms 
provided responses of which 253 were usable, for a response rate of 8.8 percent. There were 75 
envelopes that came back as undeliverable. We suspect that the response rate could be low due to small 
size and private ownership of firms in the mailing list, and the 4-page questionnaire that we used to elicit 
information on different topic areas. The President or CEO of the company provided as much as 74.5 
percent of the responses, but the proportion of responses provided by them is higher for publicly owned 
firms (78 percent) than for privately owned firms (61 percent).  However, from the data analysis and 
comparisons presented below, we note that the responding firms are representative of the firms in the 
population. 
 Table I contains distributions of sample firms by ownership type (Panel A), business activity 
(Panel B), and company size in sales (Panel C). Out of the total of 253 responding firms, 202 (79.8 
percent) are privately owned and 51 (20.2 percent) are publicly owned. By business activity, a little over 
50 percent of the firms are in manufacturing. The firms in trading (wholesale/retail) and service sectors 
comprise 10.8 percent and 7.6 percent of sample firms, respectively. In size, firms in the smallest size 
group with sales of $25 million or less formed the largest group (61.7 percent). However, the distribution 
differs with ownership type -- as much as 70.4 percent of private firms belong to the smallest size group 
compared to only 27.4 percent of public firms. At the other extreme, we find fewer private firms (7.5 
percent) in the group of firms with sales over $100 million, compared to 53.0 percent of firms from the 
category of public firms. Since a vast majority of sample firms, both private and public, have sales less 
than $500 million any generalizations we make from the findings in our study would apply primarily to 
firms in the small business environment. 
 Next, we examine if the firms that responded to the survey questionnaire are representative of the 
firms in the mailing list. Table I, Panel D, contains the comparative data of firms in the mailing list 
(population) and in the survey responses (sample). As can be seen, the distribution of firms by sales (<= 
$100 million and > $100 million) is quite similar for both the population and the sample. In sales, firms 
up to $100 million consisted of 87.8 percent of all firms in the population, which compares well with the 
83.7 percent of the responding firms belonging to that category. The response rates for private and public 
firms are also remarkably consistent for the most part. The response rates for private and public firms 
were 9.0 percent and 8.2 percent, respectively, compared to the overall response rate of 8.8 percent for all 
firms. On the basis of these observations, we believe that the responding firms are representative of the 
firms in the population.   
 
 B.  Results 
 As mentioned before, our focus in this survey is on private firms but we will make comparisons 
between private and public firms as appropriate. Further, we present our analysis separating the sample 





tests. The survey findings are divided into three major areas  – corporate governance and control, 
illiquidity of ownership interests, and valuation of common stock. 
 
 Corporate Control and Governance. We analyze the survey responses relating to questions about 
corporate control and governance in three different ways. First, we discuss shareholder agreements and 
the matters covered in those agreements. Second, we analyze the differences in shareholder agreements 
by the ownership type, ownership dispersion, inside ownership differences, and the CEO profiles. Third, 
we examine the differences in the composition of management teams and boards of directors. 
 Shareholder Agreements. In private firms, ownership and management are generally 
concentrated in a few individuals. Discussion in prior literature (e.g., Hand, Lloyd, and Rogow, 1982) 
suggests that written shareholder agreements provide a foundation for corporate control and governance 
in private firms. They are helpful in establishing shareholder rights and in reducing agency and 
information problems relating to equity investments in private firms. We gathered information relating to 
shareholder agreements using two questions in our survey instrument. The first question asked whether 
or not the company has a written „shareholders‟ agreement‟ covering matters that impact the rights and 
privileges of common stockholders. The second question asked the firms to indicate if they have written 
or established guidelines (procedures) for specific matters relating to shareholders‟ interests. The 
responses to these questions relating to shareholder agreements are summarized in Table II (Panels A, B, 
and C). 
 The summary data in Table II (Panel A) show that a total of 120 firms (49.8 percent of 
responses) have written shareholder agreements. Out of those 120 firms having written shareholder 
agreements, 102 firms are private (52 percent of private firms) and 18 firms are public (40 percent of 
public firms). The differences are not statistically significant (Chi-square = 2.12; p-value = 0.1452).  
 Panel B (Table II) provides a summary of responses relating to the various matters covered in 
shareholder agreements. In case of private firms, matters intended to protect shareholders‟ equity stakes 
and cash-flow rights are most prominent in shareholder agreements. In the order of declining importance, 
they are (1) sale, transfer, or buy-back of stock (107 firms, 74.3 percent), (2) proxy and voting procedures 
(71 firms, 49.3 percent), (3) valuation of company stock (71 firms, 49.3 percent), and (4) preemptive 
rights in equity offerings or when someone is selling (52 firms, 36.1 percent). In case of public firms, the 
top four items in their order of importance are: (1) proxy and voting procedures (44 firms, 97.8 percent), 
(2) payment of dividends (23 firms, 51.1 percent), (3) sale, transfer, or buy-back of stock (17 firms, 37.8 
percent), and (4) mergers, reorganization, or sale of the firm (13 firms, 28.9 percent). Clearly, with the 
market pricing mechanism in place, agreements concerning valuation of common stock is not important 
for stockholders of public firms compared to their high importance for stockholders of private firms. 
Agreements relating to dividend payments seem to be more important for investors in public firms than 
for investors in private firms. 
 In Panel C (Table II), we focus on private firms and conduct further analysis of the differences in 
shareholder agreements according to ownership type, insider ownership, and the CEO‟s profile. We 
concentrate on three items that are prominent in shareholder agreements – sale/transfer of common stock, 
dividend payments, and proxy/voting procedures. On the basis of the Chi-square statistics, we find that 
the group differences are statistically significant in most cases. 
 Agreements relating to sale/transfer of common stock are most common in closely-held firms 
(89.1 percent) followed by family-owned firms (69.1 percent) and widely-held firms (57.1 percent). The 
differences are statistically significant (Chi-square = 8.67; p-value = 0.0131). This suggests that having 
control over ownership rights is more critical for stockholders in family-owned and closely-held 
businesses than for the shareholders of widely-held firms. Contrary to this, agreements relating to 





closely-held or family-owned businesses. In widely-held firms, not every owner can expect to be an 
executive or employee of the firm and derive monetary compensation in the form of salaries or perks. 
Therefore, ensuring rights to cash flows and their distribution seems to be more critical for shareholders 
of widely-held firms. Further, following the analysis in Rozeff (1982), it can be argued that firms with 
widely dispersed stock ownership would attempt to mitigate equity agency costs by establishing 
shareholder rights to dividends through agreements written in advance. In widely-held firms, because of 
the diffused ownership, it appears that stockholders‟ main concern is protecting their interests by 
safeguarding the procedures relating to proxy and voting rights rather than through agreements about 
sale/transfer of common stock. 
 The relative importance of shareholder agreements also seems to vary with differences in insider 
ownership levels. Agreements about sale/transfer of ownership are slightly more prominent in firms with 
high concentrations of insider ownership (over 50 percent) than in firms with low concentrations of 
insider ownership (50 percent or less). This finding lends support to the earlier finding that owners with 
greater concentrations of stock ownership tend to safeguard their control over the firm by means of 
agreements relating to sale/transfer of common stock.  
 Agreements relating to dividend payments and proxy/voting procedures are less important in 
firms in which the CEO happens to be the largest shareholder compared to those in which the CEO is not 
the largest shareholder. The differences between the groups are statistically significant. This appears to 
be contrary to the intuition that, in order to protect minority interests,  shareholder agreements relating to 
dividends and proxy/voting procedures should be more prevalent in firms with CEOs entrenched in both 
ways, through ownership and power. A finding contrary to this expectation suggests that minority 
shareholders have fewer rights and less protection for their interests in firms. 
 Ownership Differences. The survey responses relating to ownership differences and CEO 
profiles are summarized in Table III. In Panel A we present a summary of responses relating to the 
dispersion of stock ownership in our sample firms. For the entire sample, family owned corporations 
comprise the largest proportion (52.2 percent), but the proportion is significantly higher for private firms 
compared to the proportion for public firms (64.2 percent versus 2.1 percent). At the other extreme, in the 
category of widely-held firms, a meager 7.2 percent of firms are private compared to a staggering 72.9 
percent of public firms. The Chi-square statistic of 111.44 (p-value < 0.0001) indicates that the 
ownership differences are statistically significant. This evidence confirms the private firms‟ need for 
keeping corporate control in just a few hands. Corroborating this evidence, in Panel B, we present data 
on the percentage of stock owned by corporate insiders. Corporate insiders own 50 percent or more of the 
firm‟s equity in 145 private firms (75.1 percent) compared to just 5 firms (10 percent) in public firms. At 
the lower end, only in 48 private firms (24.9 percent) the insider ownership is less than or equal to 50 
percent compared to 45 firms (90 percent) in public firms. The inside ownership differences between 
private and public companies are also statistically significant (Chi-square = 73.49; p-value < 0.0001). 
 Next, we analyze the ownership profiles of CEOs. From Panel C, we note that in 120 private 
firms (62.8 percent) the CEO is the largest stockholder whereas in only 11 public firms (22.5 percent) the 
CEO is the largest stockholder. The differences across the two groups, private vs. public, are statistically 
significant (Chi-square = 25.65; p-value < 0.0001). This finding further strengthens our priors that 
ownership and control go hand-in-hand in private firms. In response to the question whether the CEO is a 
founding member of the company, a total of 77 firms (32.1 percent) answered in the affirmative. The 
breakdown for private and public firms shows no significant differences between them (Chi-square = 
0.4965; p-value = 0.7502). We anticipated to see a larger proportion of founders to be the firms‟ CEOs in 
private firms compared to public firms. The finding of no significant differences between private and 
public firms in the founder being the firm‟s CEO came as a surprise. It is conceivable that more younger 





 In order to verify our conjecture, we separated the sample firms into two groups by their age – 
young firms in the age group of < = 25 years (52 firms) and old firms in the age group of 25 years and 
older (188 firms) and examined the frequency distributions (frequency tables not provided in the paper). 
Founders are CEOs in 35 young firms (67.3 percent) compared to 41 old firms (21.8 percent) belonging 
to the older group. The differences are statistically significant (Chi-square = 38.97; p-value < 0.0001). 
The differences are even more dramatic in private firms than in public firms. In private firms, founders 
are CEOs in 21 out of 27 firms (77.8 percent) belonging to the category of younger firms compared to 38 
out of 164 firms (23.2 percent) belonging to the category of older firms. The differences are statistically 
significant (Chi-square = 32.38; p-value < 0.0001). In public firms, the founders are CEOs in 14 out of 25 
firms (56.0 percent) belonging to the category of younger firms compared to 3 out of 24 firms (12.5 
percent) belonging to the category of older firms. The differences are statistically significant (Chi-square 
= 10.226; p-value = 0.0014). These findings do show that more often than not, we will find founder-
CEOs in younger firms, and more so in private firms than in public firms.  
 In a recent article, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (1999) analyze a model of closely held 
corporations. The authors show that founders of firms can optimally choose an ownership structure with 
several large shareholders to force them to form coalitions to obtain control. According to their model, 
the initial owners may in their own interests dilute their own power by distributing votes among several 
large shareholders, and this dilution of power commits them to form a coalition to obtain control. Further, 
the analysis in the paper implies that allowing the shareholders to freely trade shares will render an 
ownership structure with many significant owners unstable. Thus, initial owners seem to distribute voting 
rights only to those who are less likely to take control away from their hands. 
 We have analyzed the survey responses  in order to verify the validity of the results shown in 
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon‟s model of privately held corporations. If founders prefer an ownership 
structure that provides a strong coalition among shareholders, then one would expect to observe a 
dominance of family owned ownership structure in firms with founders as CEOs. The survey data 
(frequency table not included in the paper) show that 61.0 percent of founder-CEO companies are family 
owned compared to 65.6 percent of nonfounder-CEO companies. If allowing shareholders to freely trade 
shares renders an ownership structure unstable, then one would expect to find a higher degree of 
restrictions or prohibition on stock trading in founder-CEO companies than in nonfounder-CEO 
companies. We find 33.3 percent of founder-CEO firms to have total prohibition on sale/transfer of 
common stock compared to 16.5 percent of nonfounder-CEO firms. At the other extreme, only 7.8 
percent of founder-CEO firms allow for unrestricted sale/transfer of common stock compared to 26.5 
percent of firms with nonfounder-CEOs. These differences are statistically significant (Chi-square = 
11.58; p-value = 0.009). Another dimension for keeping the coalition together is by requiring approvals 
for sale/transfer of company‟s stock. Our data show that every sale/transfer of common stock requires 
approval in 76.2 percent of founder-CEO firms, compared to 53.6 percent of nonfounder-CEO firms. At 
the other extreme, only 9.5 percent of founder-CEO firms do not require an approval compared to 33.0 
percent of nonfounder-CEO firms. The group differences are statistically significant (Chi-square = 8.976; 
p-value = 0.0112). 
 The above findings are generally consistent with the results shown by the model in Bennedsen 
and Wolfenzon‟s article. The founders of private firms seem to be concerned about keeping the coalition 
together by placing restrictions/prohibition on trading in the company‟s common stock and also by 
requiring approval for sale/transfer of stock ownership. 
 Composition of Management Teams of Boards of Directors. In Table IV, we present summary 
data relating to our survey questions about management teams (Panel A) and board composition (Panel 
B). On average, the size of management teams is much smaller in private firms compared to public firms 





much smaller in private firms compared to public firms (57.0 percent versus 95.0 percent). The mean 
differences between private and public firms are statistically significant (p-values < 0.0001). What is 
surprising is the finding that the proportion of stockholder-executives is smaller in private firms than in 
public firms. This could be due to a couple of reasons – (1) private firms could be hiring outsiders in 
managerial positions for want of talent within among stockholders, and (2) executives in private firms 
may not receive stock options or stock ownership as a part of their compensation which is often the case 
with the executive compensation in public firms. In order to verify this, we looked into the existence of 
stock option plans for executives in private and public firms. Out of the 47 firms which have stock option 
plans for the firms‟ managers, 33 (70.2 percent) are public firms. 
 In Panel B (Table IV), we present data to analyze the differences in board composition between 
private and public firms. The size of boards is smaller in private firms compared to public firms (4.53 
versus 8), and the difference is statistically significant (T-ratio = 7.77; p-value <0.0001). Further, on 
average, the proportion of board members who are also the firm‟s stockholders is smaller in private firms 
than in public firms (70.8 percent versus 94.7 percent) and the mean difference is statistically significant 
(T-ratio = 5.23; p-value < 0.0001).  This is consistent with the previous finding of a smaller proportion of 
executives who are also stockholders for private firms. Further, the proportion of board members who are 
also on the firm‟s management team is higher in private firms compared to the proportion in public firms 
(62.1 percent versus 29.8 percent) and the difference between the two groups is statistically significant 
(T-ratio = 7.48; p-value < 0.0001). This finding concurs with the general expectation that power in 
private firms would be concentrated in a few individuals who are on both the executive team and the 
board of directors. However, the proportion of board of directors who are neither stockholders nor on the 
management team (outside board members) is larger in private firms compared to the proportion in 
public firms (19.5 percent versus 8.1 percent) and the difference is statistically significant (T-ratio = 
2.93; p-value = 0.0037). This could be due to a need in private firms (which are generally smaller) for 
seeking outsiders for talent that is lacking in stockholders or managers. It could also be due to having 
close affiliates of major shareholders who are neither shareholders nor on the firm‟s management team 
on the firm‟s board.  
 Both Mace (1948) and Neubauer and Lank (1998) emphasized the need for outside directors in 
family-controlled business for their expertise, objectivity, and outside perspective. We examined the data 
to verify if family-owned private firms have a larger proportion of outside directors than those which are 
widely-held. The data (frequency table not included in the paper) show that family-owned firms have the 
highest proportion of outside directors (22.0 percent), compared to 14.7 percent in closely-owned firms 
and 19.1 percent in widely-held firms. These differences seem to provide support for the contention that 
family-controlled firms prefer to have outside directors. Although it sounds paradoxical, potential serious 
conflicts among family members could be a reason why family-owned firms have the highest proportion 
of outside directors. This finding contrasts the evidence reported in Bathala and Rao (1995) where they 
found a negative relationship between inside ownership and outside directors on the board in support of 
the argument that they are substitute mechanisms for controlling agency problems in firms. 
 
 Illiquidity of Stock Ownership. Lack of active market and restrictions on sale or transfer of 
ownership are two aspects of illiquidity associated with the equity investment in private firms. In our 
survey, we sought information about the liquidity of stock ownership and summarized the responses in 
Table V. The questions referred to both sale and transfer of common stock holdings in eliciting responses 
from firms. 
 The summary data in Panel A (Table V) indicate the magnitude of illiquidity in the common 
stock of private firms. As many as 95 of a total of out of 232 firms that have responded to the question do 





52.2 percent of private firms. In an additional 45.6 percent of private firms stock trading is infrequent. 
Compared to this, in only 6 percent for public firms the stock trading is infrequent. In only four out of 
182 private firms (2.2 percent) the stock trading is frequent. Daily trading takes place in the common 
stock of 41 firms, which are all public firms. It translates to 17.7 percent of all responding firms or 82 
percent of public firms. The differences in trading between the groups are statistically significant (Chi-
square = 200.68; p-value < 0.0001).  
 We conducted further analysis of illiquidity of stock ownership in private firms according to 
ownership differences and firm size. On the basis of frequency distributions and Chi-square statistics 
(tables not presented), we find group differences to be statistically significant according to ownership 
differences but not according to the classification by firm size. Out of the four private firms with 
„Frequent‟ trading, two are closely-held and two are widely-held. In size, two firms have sales in the 
smallest size category ($25 million or less), and the other two firms are in the sales range of $50 - $250 
million. 
 The summary data presented in Panel B reveal that restrictions on sale or transfer of common 
stock are widely prevalent in private firms. Unrestricted sale or transfer of common stock is allowed in 
only 37 private firms (21.1 percent), compared to 46 public firms (92 percent). As many as 101 private 
firms (57.7 percent) have restrictions on sale or transfer of common stock to varying degrees, and in the 
other 37 private firms (21.1 percent) there exists a prohibition on sale or transfer of common stock is 
prohibited. In those firms which have prohibition against sale or transfer; the stock can only be sold back 
to the company. The differences in restrictions on sale or transfer of common stock are statistically 
significant (Chi-square = 85.53; p-value < 0.0001). We further examined the frequency distributions of 
private firms according to firm size and ownership differences (frequency tables not presented). On the 
basis of Chi-squares, we find that the group differences are statistically significant according to 
ownership differences, but not according to firm size differences. In the „Unrestricted‟ group, only 54 
percent of the firms are family owned, compared to approximately 70 percent of the firms in the 
„Prohibited‟ group.  
 The data in Panel C (Table V) provide information about the requirement of company approval 
for sale or transfer of common stock. Every sale or transfer requires company approval in 92 firms, all of 
which are private firms (45.3 percent of all firms or 59.3 percent of private firms). In 23 firms only sale 
or transfer of stock to non-affiliates require company approval, of which 21 are private firms. No 
approval is required in 88 firms of the entire sample. Of those firms, 42 are private (27.1 percent of 
private firms) and 46 are public (95.8 percent of public firms).  These differences are statistically 
significant (Chi-square = 71.28; p-value < 0.0001). Further analysis shows no statistically significant 
differences according to either firm size or ownership differences (frequency tables not presented). 
However, it would be pertinent to note that 66.3 percent of the 92 private firms in which every 
sale/transfer requires approval are family owned, compared to 58.5 percent of the 42 private firms in 
which no approvals are required. 
 The frequency of trading in private firms is probably associated with the restrictions on sale or 
transfer of stock ownership in those firms, i.e., the more the restrictions the less the frequency of trading. 
In order to verify if there is such a relationship, we examine the frequency distribution between trading 
frequency and restrictions on sale or transfer of stock ownership presented in Panel D (Table V). As can 
be seen, stock trading has never occurred in a total of 88 private firms. Of those firms, 63 (71.6 percent) 
have high restrictions or prohibition on sale/ transfer of stock ownership. At the other extreme, firms in 
which frequent trading occurs do not have either high restrictions or prohibition on sale/transfer of 






 A similar analysis of the frequency distribution between trading frequency and the requirement 
of approval for sale or transfer of common stock (frequency table not provided) shows a similar pattern. 
Every sale/transfer of common stock requires company approval in as high as 71.6 percent of firms 
which had no trading in common stock, compared to about 50 percent of firms in the other two groups 
(firms requiring no approval or an approval is required only for sale/transfer to outsiders). The group 
differences are statistically significant (Chi-square = 12.20; p-value = 0.0159). 
 Two out of the 48 public firms reported that only sale/transfer of stock to outsiders requires 
approval. We examined the characteristics of those two firms to discern more about this requirement 
which is uncharacteristic of firms whose stock trade publicly. Both firms are closely-held. One of them 
has two classes of common stock that differ in voting rights, whereas the other has cumulative voting for 
the election of board of directors. The executive teams and boards of directors have a similar 
composition in both firms. All executives and board members own stock in their company and neither 
company has outside directors. However, they differ significantly in size, one with sales over $1 billion 
and the other with sales under $25 million. In the smaller firm the CEO is a founding member as well as 
the largest stockholder whereas in the larger company the CEO is neither a founding member nor the 
largest stockholder.  
 Valuation of Common Stock. In Table VI we present a summary of responses relating to the 
methods of common stock valuation. In private firms, the top three methods of valuing common stock are 
-- (1) independent appraisers/arbitrators (79 firms; 52.3 percent), (2) multiple of book-value approach (63 
firms; 41.7 percent), and (3) discounted cash-flow approach (10 firms; 6.6 percent) -- in that order. In 
public firms, as anticipated, all 41 firms that have responded to the question reported market price as the 
method of valuation of their firms‟ common stock.  
 As noted above, the use of independent appraisers is the single most commonly used valuation 
approach in private firms. We surmise that private firms‟ preference for appraisers could  be due to the 
limitations faced by them in applying quantitative approaches to valuation of common stock. Further, we 
suspect that stockholders of private firms could be preferring independent appraisers over other 
approaches with the expectation that they will have expertise and will be unbiased in their estimations. 
Alternatively, the preference for valuations by appraisers could be due to issues relating to the ownership 
and governance in private firms. 
 In order to verify which of our above contentions hold, we have examined the differences in the 
use of independent appraisers according to ownership groups, firm size, and CEO profiles. The 
comparisons are presented in Panel B (Table VI). Among ownership groups, the use of appraisers is most 
common in closely-held firms followed by family-owned businesses. Probably, firms in those groups rely 
more upon independent appraisers in order to avoid misunderstandings among owners who belong to the 
same family or members of closely related families. In size groups, mid-size firms (sales in the range of 
$26 to $100 million) are the predominant users of independent appraisers, followed by the firms in the 
smallest size group (sales <= $25 million). With regard to the CEO profiles, firms in which CEOs are the 
largest shareholders and those in which founders are CEOs have less preference for independent 
appraisers than the firms in which CEOs are neither largest shareholders nor founders.  
 Next, we have examined the „Other valuation approaches‟ specifically stated by the responding 
firms. The following are the „Other valuation approaches‟ indicated by one firm for each – (1) An asset 
based approach, (2) A formula based on revenue and profits for the last three years, (3) Self assessment 
by the single owner, (4) A formula value updated at the fiscal year end by the CPA firm, (5) A multiple 







 In this research, we survey a large sample of US corporations to investigate corporate 
governance, illiquidity, and valuation issues in privately owned firms. We also make comparisons with 
publicly owned firms. The major findings are as follows.  
 Written shareholder agreements, although they are important for establishing shareholder rights 
and privileges in private firms, are not as common as we expected. Of the corporate matters included in 
shareholder agreements, the most prominent ones are those relating to safeguarding equity ownership 
interests and dividend payments – (1) sale, transfer, or buy-back of equity owned by shareholders, (2) 
proxy and voting procedures, (3) valuation of the company‟s stock, (4) pre-emptive rights, and (5) 
dividend payments. On further analysis, we find that in family owned and closely held firms (or in firms 
with high concentrations of insider ownership) agreements relating to sale/transfer of stock ownership 
are more important. Contrary to this, for stockholders in widely held firms (or in firms with low 
concentrations of insider ownership), agreements relating to dividend payments and proxy/voting are 
more important. 
 Family owned firms dominate the ownership structure of private firms compared to the 
dominance of widely held ownership structure in public firms. Insiders of a vast majority of private firms 
own over 75 percent of the firm‟s common stock compared to just 2.0 percent of the public-firms in 
which insider ownership is in excess of 75 percent. The CEOs of private firms more often than not tend 
to be the largest stockholders of their companies which is not the case with public firms (62.8 percent of 
private firms versus 22.5 percent of public firms). The sizes of management teams are smaller in private 
firms than in public firms. However, the proportion of executives who are also stockholders of the firm is 
smaller in private firms than in public firms. This difference appears be due to the availability of stock 
option/ownership plans for executives of public firms. 
  As with the size of management teams, the average size of boards is also smaller in private firms 
than in public firms. The proportions of directors who are also on the management team are significantly 
larger in private firms, which is indicative of greater inter-linkage between executive teams and board 
memberships in private firms and concentration of corporate power in fewer hands. Another interesting 
finding is that privately owned firms have a greater percentage of outside directors which is consistent 
with the arguments about having outside board members for objectivity and resolving conflicts among 
the closely-related stockholders.  
 Our research also documents the magnitude of illiquidity of stock ownership in private firms. No 
trading and infrequent trading of common stock was reported by 97.8 percent of private firms which 
signifies the high magnitude of illiquidity problems in privately owned common stock. Restrictions on 
sale or transfer of ownership interests confound the problem of illiquidity in common stock of private 
firms. In close to 60 percent of private firms, stock trading is either prohibited or highly restricted. Also, 
in a similar percentage of private firms every sale or transfer of common stock requires approval. At the 
other extreme, unrestricted sale/transfer or sale/transfer without the requirement of approvals exist in 
slightly more than 20 percent of the private firms. Overall, these findings provide ample evidence not 
only about the prevalence of illiquidity of stock ownership in private firms which is fairly well known 
but also about its magnitude which is a new contribution of this paper.  
 In valuing common stock, most private firms seem to rely upon the valuation by independent 
appraisers/arbitrators rather than valuations based on earnings or cash flow based methods. The use of a 
multiples of book-value is the second most popular method in private firms. Further, in privately-owned 
firms, valuation by independent appraisers is the predominant method especially in family-owned and 
closely-held firms than in widely-held firms. The prominence of valuations by independent appraisers 





concerning the issues related to the reliability of information in financial statements of private firms and 
the objectivity provided by independent appraisers.  
 In addition to providing valuable empirical evidence on various issues relating to privately-
owned corporations, this research offers guidance for further research in the area and implications for 
practitioners. One avenue of further research could focus on soliciting shareholder agreements from 
privately-owned corporations and evaluating them from the stand point of corporate governance issues. 
Another interesting piece of evidence for further investigation relates to our evidence that outside 
directors comprise a larger proportion of directors in family-owned firms than in more broadly owned 
private firms or public corporations. Although we rationalized this as a result of the need rely upon 
outside talent for the qualities lacking in privately-owned corporations, more research needs to be done in 
order to have a better appreciation of this phenomenon. Another interesting evidence concerns the 
magnitude of illiquidity in privately-owned firms and valuation of a majority of those firms by 
independent appraisers. This finding has immense implications for situations involving sale of 
businesses, ESOP purposes as required by ERISA, estate taxes, gift taxes, and litigations of all types. To 
further show the importance of our findings in the paper, out of the more than 25 million businesses in 
the USA, only 10,000 or so are publicly traded which leaves the vast majority of businesses being valued 
by independent appraisers. An interesting extension of this study would to be to conduct a survey of 
certified appraisers to examine the approaches used in their evaluations. 
 In sum, this survey provides some useful insights into the corporate control, illiquidity, and 
valuation issues in private firms. While the results are revealing in several ways, the low response rate 
may have introduced some bias into the findings reported in the paper. However, the bias does not seem 
to be serious since the firms in the mailing list and those responding to the survey are found to be similar 
in terms of firm size and the proportion of private versus public firms. Further, we find a high degree of 
consistency in responses to questions that are related to each other which is indicative of the diligence 
exercised by the individuals responding to the survey in filling out the questionnaire. Yet, findings in this 
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Sample Characteristics - Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: By Ownership Type # of Firms Percent 
Privately Owned 202 79.8 
Publicly Owned 51 20.2 
Total 253 100.0 
Panel B: By Business Activity All Firms Private Firms Public Firms 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Manufacturing 130 51.8 112 56.0 18 35.3 
Trading (Wholesale/Retail) 27 10.8 25 12.5 2 3.9 
Service 19 7.6 15 7.5 4 7.8 
Transportation 8 3.2 6 3.0 2 3.9 
Agric., Construction, Mining 24 9.5 22 11.0 2 3.9 
Banking & Other Fin Services 19 7.6 10 5.0 9 17.7 
Other 24 9.5 10 5.0 14 27.5 
Total 251 100.0 200 79.7 51 20.3 
Panel C: By Company Size in 
Sales 
All Firms Private Firms Public Firms 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
$25 million or less 154 61.7 140 70.4 14 27.4 
$26 - $100 million 54 21.8 44 22.1 10 19.6 
Over $100 million 42 16.5 15 7.5 27 53.0 
Total 250 100.0 199 100.0 51 100.0 






Table 1, continued 
 
Sample Characteristics - Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel D: Population vs. Sample 
 
Sales 













<= $100 m  2,522 211 8.4% 2,137 187 8.7% 385 24 6.2% 
Column % 87.8 83.4  94.9 92.6  62.2 47.0  
> $100 m  348 42 12.1% 114 15 13.2% 234 27 11.5% 
Column %  12.2 16.6  4.1 7.4  37.8 53.0  
Total 2,870 253 8.8% 2,251 202 9.0% 619 51 8.2% 









Written Shareholder Agreements in Firms 
 
Panel A: Question: “Does the company have a „written shareholders‟ agreement?” 
 All Firms Private Firms Public Firms 
Yes 120   (49.8%) 102   (52.0%) 18   (40.0%) 
No 121   (50.2%) 94   (48.0%) 27   (60.0%) 
Column Totals 241   (100.0%) 196   (100.0%) 45   (100.0%) 




Panel B: Question: Please indicate if the company has written or established guidelines/procedures relating to: 







(p-value) Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Sale, transfer, or buy-back of equity 















Proxy and voting procedures. 
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Table 2, continued 
 
Written Shareholder Agreements in Firms 
 
Panel C: Private Firms – Further Analysis 




By Ownership Type 
























Closely Held (n=46) 89.1 45.7 58.7 
Widely Held (n=14) 57.1 57.1 78.6 
By Insider Ownership  












51 - 75 percent (n=24) 83.3 75.0 41.7 
Over 75 percent (n=84) 78.6 32.1 42.9 
Is CEO the largest owner?  



















Panel A:  
Ownership Dispersion 
 
All Firms Private Firms Public Firms 
# of Firms % of Firms # of Firms % of Firms # of Firms % of Firms 
Family Owned 130 52.2 129 64.2 1 2.1 
Closely Held 69 27.9 57 28.4 12 25.0 
Widely Held 50 20.1 15 7.4 35 72.9 
Total 249 100.0 199 100.0 48 100 
 Chi-Square = 111.44; p-value <0.0001 
 
 
Panel B:  
Inside Ownership (%) 
 
All Firms Private Firms Public Firms 
# of Firms % of Firms # of Firms % of Firms # of Firms % of Firms 
< = 50 percent 93 38.3 48 24.9 45 90.0 
51 - 75 percent 31 12.7 27 14.0 4 8.0 
> 75 percent 119 49.0 118 61.1 1 2.0 
Total 243 100.0 193 100.0 50 100.0 











Panel C:  
Is CEO the Largest 
Shareholder?  
All Firms Private Firms Public Firms 
# of Firms % of Firms # of Firms % of Firms # of Firms % of Firms 
Yes 131 54.6 120 62.8 11 22.5 
No 109 46.4 71 37.2 38 77.5 
Total 240 100.0 191 100.0 49 100.0 
 Chi-Square = 25.65; p-value <0.0001 
   
Panel D:  
Is CEO a Founding 
Member?  
All Firms Private Firms Public Firms 
# of Firms % of Firms # of Firms % of Firms # of Firms % of Firms 
Yes 77 32.1 60 31.4 17 34.7 
No 163 67.9 131 68.6 32 65.3 
Total 240 100.0 191 100.0 49 100.0 









Composition of Management Teams and Board of Directors 
 
Panel A: Management Teams 
Private Versus Public Firms 
(Paired T-Tests) 
# of Executives on 
Management Team 
# of Executives who are 
also Stockholders 
% of Executives who 
are also Stockholders 
n Mean n Mean n Mean 
Private Firms 196 5.02 189 2.72 189 57.0 
Public Firms 49 11.84 48 10.63 48 95.0 
All Firms 245 6.38 237 4.32 237 64.7 
Mean Diff: Public - Private 6.82 7.91 38.0 
F-Ratio (Pooled F Method) 15.73 12.45 4.04 
T-Ratio (Pooled & Eq. Var.) 6.36 8.30 7.48 







Table 4, continued 
 
Composition of Management Teams and Board of Directors 
 
Panel B: Composition of Board of Directors 
Private Versus Public Firms 
(Paired T-Tests) 
Total # of 
Directors 
Directors who are 
also Stockholders 
Directors who are 
also Executives 
# of Outside 
Directors 
n Mean n Mean n Mean n Mean 
Private Firms 196 4.53 193 3.13 194 2.47 202 0.96 
Public Firms 51 8.00 50 7.66 51 2.20 51 0.55 
All Firms 247 5.24 243 4.06 245 2.42 253 0.88 
Mean Diff: Public - Private 3.47 4.53 -0.27 -0.41 
F-Ratio (Pooled F Method) 1.56 2.74 1.90 1.77 
T-Ratio (Pooled & Eq. Var.) 7.77 6.83 -1.25 -1.33 
p-Value <0.0001 <0.0001 0.2118 0.1853 
 % of Directors who are 
also Stockholders 
% of Directors who are 
also Executives 
% of Outside 
Directors 
n Mean n Mean n Mean 
Private Firms 191 70.8 192 62.1 195 19.5 
Public Firms 50 94.7 51 29.8 51 8.1 
All Firms 241 75.8 243 55.3 246 17.2 
Mean Diff: Public - Private 23.9 -32.3 -11.4 
F-Ratio (Pooled F Method) 4.72 4.55 1.79 
T-Ratio (Pooled & Eq. Var.) 5.23 -7.48 -2.93 









Liquidity of Common Stock Ownership – 
Trading Frequency, Restrictions, and Approvals 
 
Panel A: Trading 
Frequency 
Never 
Firms (Row %) 
Infrequent 
Firms (Row %) 
Frequent 
Firms (Row %) 
Daily 
Firms (Row %) 
Row Total 
Firms (Row %) 
Private 95   (52.2) 83   (45.6) 4   (2.2) 0   (0.0) 182   (100.0) 
Public 0   (0.0) 3   (6.0) 6   (12.0) 41   (82.0) 50   (100.0) 
Column Total 95   (40.9) 86   (37.1) 10   (4.3) 41   (7.7) 232   (100.0) 







Firms (Row %) 
Somewhat 
Restricted 
Firms (Row %) 
Highly 
Restricted 
Firms (Row %) 
Prohibited 
 
Firms (Row %) 
Row Total 
 
Firms (Row %) 
Private 37   (21.1) 36   (20.6) 65   (37.1) 37   (21.1) 175   (100.0) 
Public 46   (92.0) 4   (8.0) 0   (0.0) 0   (0.0) 50   (100.0) 
Column Total 83   (36.9) 40   (17.8) 65   (28.9) 37   (16.4) 225   (100.0) 







Table 5, continued 
 
Liquidity of Common Stock Ownership – 







Firms (Row %) 
Only Sale/Transfers to 
Outsiders Requires 
Approval 
Firms (Row %) 
No Approval Required 
for Sale/Transfer of 
Stock 




Firms (Row %) 
Private 92   (59.3) 21   (13.6) 42   (27.1) 155   (100.0) 
Public 0     (0.0) 2    (4.2) 46    (95.8) 48   (100.0) 
Column Total 92    (45.3) 23   (11.3) 88   (43.4) 203   (100.0) 
Chi-Square = 71.28; p-Value <0.0001 
 





Firms (Row %) 
Somewhat 
Restricted 
Firms (Row %) 
Highly 
Restricted 
Firms (Row %) 
Prohibited 
 
Firms (Row %) 
Row Total 
 
Firms (Row %) 
Never 10   (11.4) 15   (17.0) 36   (40.9) 27   (30.7) 88   (100.0) 
Infrequent 25   (30.1) 19   (22.9) 29   (34.9) 10   (12.1) 83   (100.0) 
Frequent 2   (50.0) 2   (50.0) 0   (0.00) 0   (0.00) 4   (100.0) 
Column Total 37   (21.1) 36   (20.6) 65   (37.2) 37   (21.1) 175   (100.0) 









Stock Valuation Approaches in Firms 
 
Panel A:  









Multiples of Book Value 63   (32.8) 63   (41.7) 0    (0.0) 25.46 (<0.0001) 
Multiples of Earnings 8     (4.2) 8   (5.3) 0    (0.0) 2.27  (0.1322) 
Discounted Cash Flow 10    (5.2) 10    (6.6) 0     (0.0) 2.86  (0.0906) 
Independent Appraisers 79   (41.2) 79   (52.3) 0   (0.0) 36.45 (<0.0001) 
Market Price 41   (21.4) 0   (0.00) 41 (100.0) 191.00 (<0.0001) 
Other Approaches 10   (5.21) 10   (6.6) 0   (0.0) 2.86  (0.0906) 
Note:   Cell values are the number of firms and % of firms within that category. 
            # of firms in the category are not the column totals as the firms indicated use of more than one approach. 
 
Panel B: Private Firms: Use of Independent Appraisers 
 
Ownership Groups 
Firms Using Appraisers  
Size Groups 
Firms Using Appraisers 
# of Firms % of Firms # of Firms % of Firms 
Family Owned (n=94)        49 52.1 Sales <= $25 m (n=102) 52 51.0 
Closely Held (n=47) 26 55.3 Sales $26 to $100 m (n=37) 21 56.8 
Widely Held (n=9) 4 44.4 Sales > $100 m (n=12) 6 50.0 
Is CEO the Largest 
Shareholder?   
Is CEO the Founder? 
  
Yes (n=93) 47 50.5 Yes (n=45) 21 46.7 
No (n=57) 32 56.1 No (n=106) 58 54.7 
 
 
 
 
